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Municipal Home Rule In Ohio:
The New Look
Norman Blume
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Students of municipal government in the United States repeatedly have sought to work out a more satisfactory relationship between
cities and the state. One solution proffered has been constitutional
home rule. Although often lacking preciseness, the broad purpose of
home rule is to confer more power of self-government upon municipalities by limiting legislative control in matters considered to be
strictly local in character. The more exact delineation of home rule,
in a particular state, requires
the study of the court cases
interpreting pertinent state
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though the Ohio home-rule

amendment includes sections 3
through 14 of article XVIII
of the constitution, it has been primarily section 3 that has controlled
the development of home rule in this state. This provision reads:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local
police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with
general laws.'
The key clauses are: "all powers of local self-government," and
"such local police, sanitary and similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws." The Ohio expression is different from that
found in most other home-rule states. In other jurisdictions, constitutional provisions clearly demonstrate that the state is to be supreme,
either requiring the state legislature to pass an enabling act to authorize municipalities to draw up their own charters, or compelling the
state legislature to enact laws to outline the limits of power that a
municipality may exercise. 2
In Arizona, Missouri, Oregon, Colorado, Washington, and
Michigan, provisions of the municipal charter may not be in conflict

OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
2. N.Y. CONsT. art. IX, §§ 9, 11-13; UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5; Wis. CoNsT. art XI, S 3.
In MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 36, TExAs CONsT. art. XI, § 5,
WASH. CoNsT. art. XI, § 10-11, and W.V. CONST. art. VI, 5 39a, legislative acts supersede
conflicting provisions of municipal charters and ordinances whether the matter involved be
one of state or local concern.

1.

19601

HOME RULE IN OHIO

with statutory law.3 Ohio, on the other hand, is unique for two reasons: first, home-rule powers are self-executing, 4 and second, powers
considered to be matters of local self-government are beyond state
legislative interference.5
Traditionally, the Ohio courts have decided that the constitution
provides two separate grants of authority.6 The first clause, "all
powers of local self-government," has been held to grant municipali-

ties absolute and plenary power in local affairs or in all matters of
purely local nature.7 State laws which conflict with matters of local
self-government are held invalid." Does this rule of law mean that
home-rule powers granted municipalities acted to create an imperium

in imperio?

Several authorities think not.9

It is probably true that

a "sovereign within a sovereign" is not created, but is it not possible
3. Mo. CoNsT. art. VI, § 19-20, OKLA. CoNST. art XVIII, §§ 2-7, and ARIZ. CONST. art.
XIII, §§ 2-3, state that municipal charters must be consistent with the constitution and laws
of the state. Municipal charters in Michigan and Washington are subject to and controlled by
the general laws of the state. Oregon and Colorado constitutions indicate that municipal
charters shall be subject to the constitution and criminal laws of the state.
4. Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923); cf. State
ex rel. Petit v. Wagner, 170 Ohio St. 297, 164 NXE.2d 574 (1960), where the court held that
charter municipalities had the power to enact and enforce ordinances relating to home-rule
powers regardless of procedural state law on the subject but denied this same authority to noncharter munidpalities. Accord, Morris v. Roseman, 162 Ohio St. 447, 123 N-E.2d 419 (1954).
See also Sanzere v. City of Cincinnati, 157 Ohio St. 515, 106 N.E.2d 286 (1952), where the
supreme court required non-chartered municipalities to submit their force account projects to
competitive bidding but exempted chartered municipalities.
5. State ex rel. Bindas v. Andrish, 165 Ohio St. 441, 136 N.E.2d 43 (1956); State ex rel.
Arey v. Sherill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944); Froelich v. City of Cleveland, 99
Ohio St. 376, 124 NE. 212 (1919).
6. E.g., City of Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N-E.2d 917 (1958); State ex rel.
Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953); Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71,
102 N.E. 670 (1913).
7. State ex rel. Bindas v. Andrish, 165 Ohio St. 441, 136 N.E.2d 43 (1956); State ex rel.
Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944); Village of Perrysberg v. Ridgway,
108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923); Froelich v. City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124
N.E. 212 (1919). In Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 365, 103 N.E. 512, 519
(1913), Judge Wanamaker said:
The first half relates wholly to municipal power... [t~he first half is as unlimited as the second half is limited. The second half could not possibly relate to
municipal power because the first half is as comprehensive as a grant of power could
be and therefore no addition could be made... if it be claimed that "not in conflict
with the general laws" as found in the second half modifies also the first half, then it
must follow that all municipalities are as absolutely under the control and domination of the state legislature today as they were before the adoption of the home rule
amendment . . . home rule would be but an empty egg-shell, a mere snare and
ideality.
8. But state laws passed on matters decided to be of a state-wide concern have been ruled by
the courts to pre-empt municipal legislation on the same affair. See Bucyrus v. State Department of Health, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929); City of Cincinnati v. American
Tel. & Tel Co., 112 Ohio St. 493, 147 NE. 806 (1925); Zielonka v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St.
220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919).
9. Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practise, 9 OHIo ST. UJ. 18, 21
(1948). Cf. State ex rel. Brickell v. Frank, 129 Ohio St. 604, 196 N.E. 416 (1935); Niehaus
v. State ex rel. Board of Education, 111 Ohio St. 47, 144 N.E. 433 (1924); Billings v. Cleveland Ry., 92 Ohio St. 478, 111 N.E. 155 (1914).
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that a kind of limited autonomy has been established? For example,
when the courts adjudged various functions to be matters of local
self-government, did they not find an area of sovereign powers in
which the state cannot interfere? By recognizing the authority of a
municipality to elect its own officers, to control its own public employees, and to exercise powers of eminent domain, as powers which
cannot be taken away from the municipality by the state, the courts
of Ohio, in effect, have said that these are building blocks upon which
a limited municipal sovereign is constructed. 10
The major difficulty with home rule in Ohio, as elsewhere, has
been the determination of those matters which were purely local affairs under the concept of "powers of local self-government."" The
courts have been left with the task of resolving this problem in specific cases and have not been particularly successful with the assigned
task. A statement made by the Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel.
Toledo v. Cooper,1 2 is illustrative of the problem. The court said:
Indisputably these provisions are hazy and ambiguous and it is unfortunate that the members of the Constitutional Convention did not
more fully define the powers of local self-government committed to
chartered cities. This would relieve the courts from the exercise of wide
discretion and from never ending appeals for construction of this constitutional clause; and likewise, relieve the judicial department of the
government from the criticism too often made that it has exercised the
power of framing a constitution - a power that has been lodged solely
in the people., 3

This reluctance did not deter the Ohio courts from making attempts
at a reasonable definition. In Toledo v. Lynch,' 4 the supreme court
defined local self-government as ".. . such powers of government as,
in view of their nature and the field of their operation, are local and
municipal in character."' 5 In Fitzgeraldv. City of Cleveland, 6 powers of local self-government "... are clearly such as to involve the exercise of the functions of government, and they are local in the sense
10. See Solomon v. City of Cleveland, 26 Ohio App. 19, 21-22, 159 N.E. 121, 122 (1926),
where the appellate court said that the effect of municipal home rule in Ohio was to create a
"small state, and the same methods of construing laws prevail in applying constitutional prohibitions to it as prevail in the construction of laws enacted by the state legislature." See also
Village of Brook Park v. City of Cleveland, 26 Ohio Op. 536 (C.P. 1943), where the common pleas court said home rule was the creation of a system of dual sovereignties within the
state of Ohio. See also State ex rel. Gulf Refining Co. v. DeFrance, 89 Ohio App. 1, 100
N.E.2d 689 (1950), where Judge Fess mentions a type of imperium in imperio being established by home-rule chartered cities.
11. See Fordham and Asher, note 9 supra,at 25 where they said that "... as the expression of
a broad political idea, the Ohio term carries considerable meaning, but as a legal concept it
is as lacking in sharpness of meaning, after 35 years interpretation as it was at the outset."
12. 97 Ohio St. 86, 119 N.E. 253 (1917).
13. Id. at 91, 119 N.E. at 255.
14. 88 Ohio St. 71, 102 N.E. 670 (1913).
15. Id. at 97, 102 N.E. at 673.

16. 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
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that they relate to municipal affairs of the particular municipality."1 7
Again in State ex rel. Arey v.Sherrill,' the court said that the expression ". . . all powers of local self-government as herein used
means the power of self-government in all matters of a purely local
nature.'- ' What are these specific powers? This information can
only be determined by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.
The second clause of section 3, article XVIII, involves local police regulations which do not conflict with state law.20 This grant of
power is not as complete as the first clause because municipal police
authority may not conflict with the general laws of the state.2 ' In
the past there was some debate as to whether the use of the police
power by municipalities was part of the state police power, 22 or an
independent municipal power.23 The view most frequently accepted
by the Ohio courts, as expressed in Greenberg v. Cleveland,24 is that
"Section 3, Article XVIII, of the Ohio constitution dearly contemplates that both the state and the municipalities of the state may exercise the same police power; the only limitation being that the exercise
of that power
by a municipality shall not conflict with general laws
' 25
of the state.
When does conflict between a state law and a municipal ordinance
occur so that the latter will be nullified by the courts? To answer
this question two terms need to be defined. The first one involves
the meaning of the words "general laws" as found in section 3, article
XVIII. The supreme court, in Fitzgerald v. Cleveland,20 said that
general laws must be applied uniformly throughout the state and also
must be of state-wide concern. In Leis v. Cleveland,27 the court similarly defined general laws to be those laws which ". . . apply to all
parts of the state alike. ' 2 The decisions in Scheiderman v. Sesanstein29 and in Youngstown v. Evans30 added that general laws not
only be uniform in their operation but also apply to the people gen17. Id. at 344, 103 N.E. at 514.
18. 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 NXE.2d 501 (1944).
19. Id. at 578, 53 N.E.2d at 504.
20. Omo CoNsT. art. XVIII, 5 3. ... and such local police, sanitary and similar regula.
tions, as are not in conflict with general laws."
21. State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St 574, 52 N.E.2d 501 (1944).
22. Cleveland Tel. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 362, 121 NE. 701, 702
(1918), where the court said, "there is no such thing as a municipal police power as distinguished from state police power."
23. Ellis v. Blakemore, 116 Ohio St. 650, 660, 157 N.E. 330, 333, (1927), where it was
said that "... the police power... is only local police power."
24. 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N.E. 829 (1918).
25. Id. at 286, 120 N.E. at 830.
26. 88 Ohio St. 339, 103 N.E. 512 (1913).
27. 101 Ohio St.162, 128 N.E. 73 (1920).
28. Id. at syllabus 2.
29. 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929).
30. 121 Ohio St 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929).
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erally.3 ' In the main, therefore, it may be concluded that the courts
have interpreted this expression to mean laws which operate uniform32
ly throughout the state and apply to people of the state generally.
Although occasionally employing the doctrine of negative implication,33 the Ohio courts generally refer to Village of Struthers v.
Soko134 in deciding the matter of "conflict." In that case, the supreme court adopted the "head on clash" theory that "no real conflict can exist unless the ordinance declares something to be right
which the state law declares to be wrong, or vice versa. There can
be no conflict unless one authority grants a permit or license to do
an act which is forbidden or prohibited by the other."3 5 The court
further stated that a police ordinance would not be held in conflict
with the general law: (1) "merely because certain specific acts are
declared unlawful by the ordinance, which acts are not referred to
in the general law," or (2) "because certain specific acts are omitted
in the ordinance but referred to in the general law," or (3) "because
different penalties are provided for the same acts, even though
greater penalties are imposed by the municipal ordinance." 3 6 But
different penalties cannot have the effect of changing state policy,
such as making a felony under a state law a misdemeanor under muniMere inconsistency, however, is not enough. Conflict
cipal law.
cannot occur until the legislature and the municipality have directly
passed on the subject.38
Concerning the status of a "mixed power," the Supreme Court of
Ohio presently seems to favor the broad view espoused by former
judge Wanamaker.3 9 He felt that powers of local self-government
and municipal police powers were tied together by the conjunction
"and" which linked the two major clauses of section 3, article XVIII.
He said that "and" does not mean less, but more; that "and" is not
a word of subtraction, but "addition. ' 40 Recently, the supreme court
appeared to have affirmed this view when it held that ".

.

. the limi-

tation [police powers shall not conflict with state law] is only such a
31. 121 Ohio St. 80, 83, 167 N.E. 158, 159 (1929).
32. See note, 20 U. CINC. L. REV. 400, 403 (1951).
33. See Neil House Hotel Co. v. City of Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665
(1944), where the state liquor board's administrative order, which forbade the sale and consumption of liquor between the hours of 2:30 A.M. and 5:30 A.M., was held to be a general
law which had by implication precluded the municipality from prohibiting the sale of liquor
before the above mentioned time.
34. 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
35. Id. at 268, 140 N.E. at 521.
36. Id. at syllabus 3.
37. City of Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958).
38. City of Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929); City of Fremont
v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917).
39. State ex rd. Cleveland Tel. Co. v. Court of Common Pleas, 98 Ohio St. 164, 120 N.E.
335 (1918).
40. Id. at 186, 120 N.E. at 340.
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the mere fact that the exercise of a power of

local self-government may happen to relate to the police department
does not make it a police regulation within the meaning of the words
police regulation found in that constitutional provision." '
By limiting the effect of the second clause of section 3 upon the first clause
of that section, the present day Ohio court seems to sustain the
broader Wanamaker view of home-rule power.
Fordham and Asher, in 1948, concluded that "the experience of
Ohio with Municipal Home Rule has been a rather unhappy business."14 Another authority, in examining the experience of the City
of Cincinnati, decided that the courts in Ohio had "...
straightjacketed the full development of home rule ...
One year later,

in his study, still another authority stated that "for practical purposes, we might forget about the sections of article XVIII and go on
the theory that Ohio municipalities may exercise only such powers of
local self-government as the legislature or supreme court do not take
away.'"" He blamed the judges of the supreme court for this situation.45
A number of factors have hindered the development of home rule
in this state.48 Without question, the judges of the courts have
played an important role. Being of a conservative bent naturally,
they have tended in the past to interpret narrowly municipal power.
But they are not the exclusive culprits. To begin with, the framers
of the constitution were not specific as to what they actually intended
in the home-rule amendment.4 7 Secondly, in the past and today, students of home rule differ as to the very meaning of the term. 8 One
camp follows the home-rule model recommended by the National
Municipal League in its Model State Constitution. This position favors the establishment of a type of local federalism49 which would
41. State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 197, 151 N.E.2d 722, 727 (1958).
42. See Fordham and Asher, note 9 supra, at 70. At this time the health, police, fire, tax,
education, et al. functions were held to be state-wide activities.
43. Seasongood, Cincinnatiand Home Rule, 9 Otno ST. L.J. 114 (1948).
44. Alexander, Ohio Home Rule (ms. in the files of the Stephen Wilder Foundation)
(1949).
45. Id. at Foreword; accord, Walker, Toward a New Theory of Municipal Home Rule, 50

Nw. U.L. REV. 575 (1955).
46. Cohn, MunicipalRevenue Powers in the Context of Constitutional Home Rule, 51 Nw.
U.L. REV. 30 (1956); see Fordham, Metropolitan Regionalism: Developing Governmental
Concepts, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 442 (1957), where the writer stated that "in a sense,
home rule is a recognition of state legislative weakness and an effort to escape its effects...."
47. See Fordham and Asher, note 9 supra, at 27; see also PROCEEDING AND DEBATES OF
THE CONSTTUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OlIO, 1463, 1485, 1489 (1913).
48. Chicago Government - Report of the Chicago Home Rule Commission 15 (1954).
"Home Rule," the report said, "is a paradoxical enigma, attractive and appealing, yet unattainable to any significant degree."
49. MoTr, HOME RuLE FOR AMERICA's CITIES 31 (1949); MCBAIN, THBE LAW AND THE
PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE v (1915), where he discusses what he calls
"Rights of Home Rule." He states that these rights are municipal powers "conferred by the
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place city-state relations on a basis similar to that existing between
the state and nation. The other major group appears to follow the
home-rule plan advanced by the American Municipal Association."
This scheme favors a form of legislative home rule which subjects
municipalities to legislative control.
A third factor that has contributed to the retarded growth of
municipal home rule in Ohio concerns the inherent problem of distinguishing between matters that are state-wide and those that are
local in scope. To begin with, municipal activities are generally of
a mixed nature. They are dynamic and not static. At one point in
history they may have been local in character, whereas with the passage of time they have become mixed or statewide in scope. An example of this phenomenon is control over local streets. Once, such
control was considered to be exclusively a municipal activity. Today,
with the development of state highway systems, this activity is at
least of a mixed nature. In addition, municipal activities vary with
the size of cities. For example, in some larger metropolitan cities
like New York City, arterial highways are matters of local concern.
In smaller cities arterial highways are county, state, or mixed statelocal responsibilities. The problem of drawing the line between local
and state matters is one that has always perplexed interpreters of
home-rule powers.
Finally, the wording of the constitutional provisions in Ohio and
other states has caused some difficulty. If the constitutional phrases
used were more explicit," x the intent of the framers and that of the
people who ratified the proposal would become more clearly prepeople of the state through the medium of their fundamental law . . . which may, like the
similar rights of private persons, be defended in courts against invasion by the legislative arm
of the government." Professor Kneier also accepts this definition for he states that "constitutional home rule is, in a sense, the application of the federal principle of government to the
relations between city and state." KNEIER, CITY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
87-88 (rev. ed. 1947). Accord, Bromage, Home Rule - NML Model, 44 NAT'L MUNIC.
REV. 132 (1955). See Seegmiller, Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Advisory
Committee Report on Local Government (1955).
50. Fordham, Home Rule - AMA Model, 44 NAT'L MUNIc. REV. 137 (1955); Accord,
McGOLDRICK, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE, 1916-1930, 2 (1933),
who said that home rule is "not concerned with a philosophy of local autonomy in contradistinction to state control." See Niehaus v. State ex rel. Board of Education, 111 Ohio St. 47,
53, 144 N.E. 433, 434 (1924) where the Supreme Court of Ohio said:
... the sovereignty of the state over the municipality is not divested by that provision, nor does the power of the sovereign to administer public affairs end at the
corporation line. The only feature of the sovereign power which is granted by the
so-called "home rule" provision of the Constitution is that which relates solely to
local government .... Such municipalities and their offices are still agencies of the
state, acting in behalf of that portion of the state in which they have jurisdiction.
51. See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION (5th ed. 1948),
where numerous specific powers are granted to municipalities. Among them is the power to
levy and collect taxes, to borrow money, to adopt and enforce local police and sanitary regulations, to provide for slum clearance, and to construct public facilities. At the same time, it is
also possible for the people of the state to indicate, for purposes of clarity, that there are certain functions such as education, the issuance of licenses, and so forth, which they want uniformly administered.
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sented. It has been intimated that, if the original proposal as submitted by the committee on local government at the constitutional
convention in 1912 had been retained, the courts in Ohio might have
taken a more favorable path in interpreting home rule in Ohio." Regardless of how the responsibility for the retarded development of
home rule in Ohio is assessed, it must be pointed out that the Supreme
Court of Ohio has recently adopted a more sympathetic approach
toward municipal home rule. This new mode can be observed more
readily by examining relevant cases decided by that court since 1950.
Throughout the 1950's, the supreme court appears to have modified its former restrictive approach toward municipal home rule. In
several areas, such as control of municipal policemen and firemen,
eminent domain, urban renewal, disposal of municipal property, and
the operation of municipal government, municipal power has been
enlarged. Thus, it may be concluded that a new, more liberal outlook
toward home rule has been accepted in Ohio.
Policemen and Firemen
A recapitulation of the cases involving municipal control over
policemen and firemen will serve two functions. One purpose is to
provide a panoramic view of the historical evolution of home rule in
Ohio. A second aim is to demonstrate the full flowering in Ohio of
the "new look."
Beginning with the early and leading case of State ex rel. Lentz v.
Edwards,53 the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that municipal employees under the civil service were to be regarded as local employees
controlled by local laws. It said that "the manner of regulating the
civil service is peculiarly a matter of municipal concern."5
Later,
the court in State ex rel. Togt v. Doneghy5 5 applied the reasoning of
the Lentz case to municipal police officials. It said that "the matter
of the appointment of police officers is purely a matter of local selfgovernment."5 6 This line of reasoning was followed sporadically
throughout the 1920's and 1930's as the Ohio courts sustained municipal control over the manner in which policemen and firemen were
to be promoted, 57 disciplined,58 and retired. 9
52. Walker, Municipal Government in Ohio Before 1912, 9 Omo ST. U.. 1, 16 (1948);
see Constitutional Debates, supra note 47, at 1457, 1464-65.
53. 90 Ohio St. 305, 107 N.E. 768 (1914).
54. Id. at 309, 107 N.E. at 769.
55. 108 Ohio St.440, 140 N.E. 609 (1923).
56. Id. at 445, 140 N.E. at 611.
57. Hile v. City of Cleveland, 118 Ohio St. 99, 160 N.E. 621 (1928); State ex rel. Jackson
v. Dayton City Comm'n, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 378 (Ct. App. 1939) (Respecting the promotion of a district fire chief).
58. Ferguson v. Collins, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 6 (Ct. App. 1933), dismissed for lack of constitutional question, 127 Ohio St. 419, 189 N.E. 4 (1933); accord, Penrod v. Woehler, 18 Ohio
L. Abs. 135 (Ct. App. 1934) (dismissal of a fire chief).
59. City of Toledo v. State ex rel. Lawler, 51 Ohio App. 329, 1 NXE.2d 171 (1935), dismissed for lack of constitutionalquestion, 130 Ohio St. 171, 198 N.E. 39 (1935).

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[September

During the 1930's and 1940's, a major change in policy took hold
in Ohio courts. Throughout this period the Supreme Court of Ohio
handed down a number of decisions restricting home-rule powers.
Several of these cases involved the area of police and fire department
administration. In Cincinnati v. Gamble,60 the question was raised
whether the state statutes (Ohio General Code sections 4600 and
4616),61 establishing a state retirement plan for firemen and policemen, should prevail over a conflicting municipal retirement program.
The City of Cincinnati claimed that under its powers of local selfgovernment it could establish its own retirement system for police
and fire officials. The court rejected this argument, saying that the
activities of a municipality were of a dual nature. Some functions of
the municipality are carried out under its powers of local self-government; other acts are simply performed in its capacity as an arm or
agency of the state. The court said, ". . . police, fire, and health protection are within the sovereign power of the state, and with respect
thereto, municipalities, whether governed by a charter or not, are
arms or agencies of state sovereignity. 0' ' 2 The court assumed that
the state had exclusive control over matters pertaining to health, fire,
and police administration.6 3
On the same day that the supreme court decided the Gamble case,
it also rendered judgment in State ex rel. O'Driscoll v. Cull. 64 The
facts in this case again involved a conflict between a state statute and
a municipal ordinance. The ordinance required that an applicant for
the position of patrolman have a high school education; the statute
prohibited educational prerequisites as a condition for taking a civil
service examination. The court, following the reasoning in the Gamble case, sustained the statute.
Later that year the court declared invalid, in State ex rel. Strain
v. Houston,"5 the attempt of the City of Cincinnati to substitute its
own hourly system for firemen in place of the state's two-platoon system of hourly work. It rejected the home-rule argument of the city
and rested its decision upon both the statewide theory of the Gamble
60. 138 Ohio St. 220, 34 N.E.2d 226 (1941).
61. OHIo REv. CODE § 741.02, 741.32.
62. Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 230, 34 N.E.2d 226, 232 (1941).
63. Judge Turner (in dissent at 232) stated that as long as the states did not take over
actual operation of the departments, the employees of such departments are municipal employees and their employment, discharge, etc., remain matters of local self-government. He
believed that municipalities should have control over the organization, personnel and administration of police and fire departments. See Fordham and Asher, supra note 9, at 32, where
they pose the question, "is the power of the state in matters of police, health and fire protection exclusive, or is there a middle ground where the municipality may have some local
authority over the organization, personnel, and administration of police and fire departments?"
They believe that such activity is not completely state-wide but is of a mixed state and local

nature. The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed in 1958.
64. 138 Ohio St. 516, 37 N.E.2d 49 (1941).
65. 138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E.2d 219 (1941).
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case and the "conflict with general laws" clause of section 3, article

XVIII. 66 The supreme court, however, did modify the pre-emptive

state-wide theory in the Gamble case, saying that the municipalities
could pass legislation on matters involving ".... public peace and the
protection of persons and property . . ." as long as ". . . the legislation . . 67
. did . . . not conflict with state legislation on the same
'
subject.
In the succeeding few years the state-control philosophy was maintained with respect to the retirement of members of the police and
fire divisions,"" the tenure, appointment, and removal of a fire
chief,69 and the right of a policeman 0 to appeal to the court of common pleas under state law.
1 further strengthThe decision in State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill"
ened the "state-wide" concept. In this decision, the Supreme Court
of Ohio held that the state statute, Ohio General Code section 4368,72
which granted a city director of public safety the authority to try
disciplinary cases against fire and police personnel, prevailed over a
charter provision that permitted the city manager to perform this
duty. Judge Bell laid the final brick in the wall supporting the "statewide" concept when he said, "it would be a bold man who would
assert that the police power of the state does not include the establishment of a general control over police departments and the mem' 73
bers thereof.
In the 1950's the Supreme Court of Ohio returned to its earlier,
more liberal interpretations. During this period, the court mainly
followed the Lentz and Doneghy rulings. It did not, however, immediately reverse the preceding 1940 cases which supported the
"state-wide" theory of restricted home-rule powers. It began very
hesitatingly; in fact, so hesitatingly that a certain amount of inconsistency74 and confusion existed in the law until clarified in the mo66. Fordham and Asher, supra note 9, at 33, commented that if the state concern idea is a
complete theory in and of itself, why then should the court use the weaker second clause of
section 3, article XVIII?
67. State exrel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203, 210, 34 N.X.2d 219, 223 (1941).
68. State ex rel. Daly v. Toledo, 142 Ohio St. 123, 50 N.E.2d 338 (1943).
69. State ex rel. Giovanello v. Village of Lowellville, 139 Ohio St. 219, 39 N.X.2d 527
(1942).
70. In re Fortune, 138 Ohio St. 385, 35 N.X.2d 442 (1941).
71. 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944). Judge Bell did not completely divorce the
municipalities from exercising police administrative powers; he said, "that the police department of a city is a matter of state-wide concern does not prevent the city from adopting any
regulation in reference thereto so long as such regulation does not conflict with general laws."
Id. at 581, 53 N.E.2d at 505.
72. Onto REV. CODE § 737.02.
73. State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 579, 53 N.E.2d 501, 504 (1944).
74. See State ex rel. Lynch v. Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 438, 132 N.E.2d 118, 120
(1956).
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mentous decision of State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips.75 A survey of
the important cases will illustrate the change in basic philosophy
which has captured the Supreme Court of Ohio.
At issue in the LaPolla v. Davis case,7 decided in 1950, was the
question of whether a police chief could be appointed to the position
of deputy mayor in accordance with the municipal charter, or whether
the state law on this subject governed. The Common Pleas Court
of Mahoning County said that "as long as the requirements for a
municipal charter comply with provisions of Article XV, Section 10
. . . and do not conflict with any other of its provisions, they are
valid .... ,,7 On appeal, the supreme court dismissed the petition.

The court caused some anxiety because it seemed to ignore the precedents established in Ohio.
In 1953, the supreme court added to the growing perplexity in
this area when it rendered the decision in Harsney v. llen.7 s This
case questioned the power given a police chief under the charter of
the City of Youngstown to transfer a radio operator to a patrolman's
post. The court sustained the authority of the police chief by resorting to the reasoning used in the Lentz and La Polla cases. It
first cited the statutes, Ohio General Code sections 4372 and 4374,71
as grants of adequate authority, but then went on to state that "the
organization and regulation of its police force, as well as its civil service functions, are within a municipality's power of local self-government."" ° Of note in this case was the complete absence again of any
precedent for the holding of police personnel to be employees of the
state. With this decision, confusion was complete. Were municipal
firemen and policemen employees of the local municipality or the
state? Were the police and fire functions local or state activites?
Chief Justice Weygandt, in State ex rel. Lynch v. Cleveland,"'
recognized this confusion when he said that there are many inherent
difficulties confronting one who attempts to interpret home rule. For
example:
...a power that dearly is one of "local" self-government to one mind
is dearly contrary to another .... This court has attempted to be helpful
by announcing certain principles to be observed in construing and
applying the constitutional language, but the decisions have been limited

mainly to the intermittent consideration of a particular power as it has
75.

168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).

76.
Ohio
77.
78.

89 N.E.2d 706 (Ohio C.P. 1948), dismissed for lack of a constitutional question, 151
St. 550, 86 N.E.2d 615 (1950).
Id. at syllabus 4.
160 Ohio St. 36, 113 N.E.2d 86 (1953).

79.

OHIO REV. CODE

§§

737.06, 737.05.

80. Harsney v. Allen, 160 Ohio St. 36, 41, 113 N.E.2d 86, 88 (1953).
81. 164 Ohio St. 437, 132 N.E.2d 118 (1956), 25 U. CINc. L. REV. 378 (1956); note, 26
U. CINc. L. REv. 415 (1957); Sonenfield, Municipal Corporations,Survey of Ohio Law 1956, 8 WEST. REs. L. REV. 347 (1957).
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been questioned. Hence, it is not surprising, either, that with the changing personnel of the court, during the forty-four years these provisions
have been in effect, it has been no easy task to maintain something even
remotely resembling consistence .... 82

In this case a municipal inspector of police challenged the appointment of a chief of police of the City of Cleveland made under the
authority of the city charter. The plaintiff claimed that the state
law (Ohio Revised Code section 143.34), which requires that the
position be filled from the civil service list, should have been followed. In its reasoning, the court attempted to read some clarity
into the existing states of the law of home rule by distinguishing the
rules relating to the operation of a police department and the method
of selecting a chief of police. With respect to the former, the court
seemed to indicate that state law prevailed, while as to the latter, the
municipal charter should remain paramount authority. Therefore,
the method of selecting a chief of police was considered a matter of
local self-government. In a concurring opinion, Judge Taft said that
"it is regrettable that this court should neglect either to overrule,
distinguish, or even to notice its previous decisions and pronouncements of law made so recently and which are so difficult to reconcile
with the decisions rendered in the La Polla case. ' s3 Thus, the basic
inconsistency of the Lentz and Doneghy cases when compared with
the rulings in the Gamble, Sherrill, and Cull cases, still remained to
puzzle students of home rule in Ohio.
Not until the most significant case of State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips,"' did the Ohio Supreme Court face up to its responsibilities and
attempt to reconcile the inconsistent precedents it had established. In
this case a mandamus action was brought to compel the safety director of the City of Columbus to retract his appointment of a new
deputy inspector of police. The plaintiff argued that the safety director had not complied with the statute, Ohio Revised Code section
143.34, which required that vacancies above the rank of patrolman
be filled by the recipient of the highest examination grade. The
safety director relied upon the authority of the charter which permitted the safety director to appoint any of three persons who had
attained the highest scores on the examination.
Justice Taft, in writing the majority decision, resorted to the
precedents mentioned in the State ex rel. Vogt v. Doneghy and Harsney v. .llen cases above. First he distinguished and limited the possible effect of the second half of section 3, article XVIII ("local police, sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in conflict with
the general law") upon the first half of that section ("municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-govern82. State ex rel. Lynch v. Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 438, 132 NB.2d 118, 120 (1956).
83. Id. at 441, 132 NX..2d at 121.
84. 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.X.2d 722 (1958), 20 OmIo ST. L.. 152 (1959).

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[September

ment") .85 Justice Taft then went on to specifically clarify the status
of police and fire department administration in Ohio:
It is undoubtedly true that the enforcement of laws by police in every
part of the state is a matter of "state wide concern." Undoubtedly the
state has power to provide for police in every part of the state to enforce
its laws. Actually in providing for sheriffs, our state laws do provide for
such police. However, where a municipality establishes and operates a
police department, it may do so as an exercise of the powers of local
self-government conferred upon it by sections 3 and 7 of Article 18 of
the constitution. If it does, the mere interest or concern of the state,
which may justify the state in providing similar police protection will
not justify the state's interference with
such exercise by a municipality
86
of its powers of local self-government.

Additional insight into the "new look" philosophy is found in the
statement by Justice Taft with respect to the scope of the restriction
on home-rule municipalities placed in article XV, section 10. He said
that the authority therein granted the state prevails only if it ".

.

. will

not restrict the exercise by such cities of their powers of local selfgovernment. Thus, such laws may be applicable, for example, where
a city has failed to enact charter or legislative provisions on the subject covered by the statutes and the statutes do not conflict with any
charter or municipal legislative provision or where a city has in its
charter expressly adopted the state statutes. '8 7 As indicated above,
the presumption, henceforth, seems to sustain municipal home-rule
powers against state law.
Finally, the supreme court specifically overruled: (1) paragraph
4 of the syllabus in Cincinnati v. Gamble, (2) paragraphs 4, 5, and
6 of the syllabus in State ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, and (3) the cases
of State ex rel. O'Driscoll v. Cull and State ex rel. Daly v. Toledo.
It also questioned the reasoning and soundness of: (1) paragraph 3
of the syllabus in Cincinnati v. Gamble, (2) paragraphs 2 and 4 of
the syllabus in State ex rel. Strain v. Houston, and (3) the decision
in In re Fortune. By delineating the above, the court specifically
overruled the concept that police and fire protection are state-wide
activities.
88
Power to Define Crimes

Prior to the home-rule amendment, the power to enact municipal
criminal ordinances was dependent upon state law, either expressed
or implied. In 1912, municipalities were granted power directly in

section 3, article XVIII, to enact ordinances defining crimes.
ordinances were valid as long as they: (1)
85.
86.
87.
88.

These

conformed to legal re-

State ex tel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 197, 151 N.E.2d 722, 727 (1958).
Id. at 200, 151 N.E.2d at 729.
Id. at 195, 151 N.E.2d at 726.
See Perillo, Peace and Order Power of an Ohio Municipal Corporation, 3 CLEv.-MAIu

L. REv. 45 (1954).
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quirements of having a reasonable purpose, (2) avoided arbitrary
means of effectuating that purpose, and (3) did not conflict with the
general laws of the state.
In recent years, the liberty granted municipalities to define
crimes 80 has been considerably broadened. Several cases which illustrate a more sympathic approach toward home rule have involved the
power of a municipality to define and punish the crime of assault and
battery. The City of Dayton enacted Ordinance Number 943-2,

which marked out the crime of assault and battery and listed the
maximum punishment that may be inflicted upon violators thereof.
The maximum authorized penalty embraced a $1,000 fine or one year
imprisonment or both. These provisions were at variance with two

state statutes: (1) Ohio General Code section

1 24 2 3 ,

0

which limited

the punishment that may be imposed upon those who commit the
crime of assault and battery to a $200 fine or six months or both,

and (2) Ohio General Code section 3628,"' which restricted the
power of any municipality to levy penalties on any crime to a $500
fine or six months or both. The appellate court of Montgomery
County, in Matthews v. Russell, 2 followed the rules of conflict established in Struthers v. Soko1 3 and Youngstown v. Evans."" In the

former case, the court decided that conflict did not occur merely because there happens to be a difference in penalties; and, in the latter,
it held that conflict did not occur, because it considered the statute,

Ohio General Code section 3628, not to be a general law within the
meaning of the home-rule amendment.

Thus, the City of Dayton

was granted authority not only to define the crime of assault and battery, but also to impose penalties greater than those permitted under

state law.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the position taken in the
89. Ohio municipalities have been granted by the courts the power to define: fraud perpetrated at jewelry auctions, Holsman v. Thomas, 112 Ohio St. 397, 147 N.E. 750 (1925);
disturbance of the public peace and order, Village of Leipsic v. Folk, 38 Ohio App. 177, 176
N.E. 95 (1931), accord, City of Cleveland Heights v. Christie, 128 Ohio St. 297, 190 N.E.
770 (1934); the publication of racing tips in newspapers, Solomon v. City of Cleveland, 26
Ohio App. 19, 159 N.E. 121 (1926), appeal dismissed, 116 Ohio St. 739, 158 N.E. 8 (1927);
horse bookmaking, City of Columbus v. Ganner, 88 Ohio App. 146, 98 N.E.2d 75 (1950);
the reselling of railroad tickets, Schwartz v. Youngstown, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 229 (Ct. App.
1938); the selling of contraceptive devices, City of Toledo v. Kohlhofer, 96 Ohio App. 355,
122 N.E.2d 20 (1954); people loitering and acting srspiciously, Welch v. City of Cleveland,
97 Ohio St. 311, 120 N.E. 206 (1918), accord, City of Youngstown v. Aiello, 156 Ohio St.
32, 100 N.E.2d 62 (1951); begging, Le Fever v. City of Columbus, 23 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 372
(1921), accord, City of Cleveland v. Gogola, 113 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953); and
pocket-picking, Greenburg v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N.E. 829 (1918).
90. OHIo REV. CODE § 2901.25.

91.

Omo REv. CODE

715.67.

92. 87 Ohio App. 443, 95 N.E.2d 696 (1949); occord, It re Calhoun, 87 Ohio App. 193,
94 NE.2d 388 (1949).
93. Supra, note 34.
94. Supra, note 30.
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Matthews case when it decided Dayton v. Miller.5 The facts were
essentially the same as in the Matthews case, the same question
was involved, and the same conclusion rendered. The court said,
"municipal corporations of this state have authority to define, by
ordinance, the offense of assault and battery and prescribe punishment thereof."9' 6
For a while, this left the scope of municipal power to define
crimes in an uncertain status. Since Ohio municipalities had been
given authority by the Ohio Constitution to define crimes, and since
the Matthews and Miller cases permitted municipalities to impose
fines and punishment beyond the limitations prescribed by state law,
did it mean that a municipality in Ohio might enter the field of defining major crimes? At the time, the consensus of legal opinion indicated the contrary.9 7 This view appears to have been supported
by the supreme court in City of Cleveland v. Betts." The facts in
this decision involved a conflict between a Cleveland ordinance
(Ordinance Number 11.2314), which made the carrying of concealed
weapons a misdemeanor, and a statute (Ohio Revised Code section
2923.01), which defined this crime as a felony. The question to be
decided was whether a municipality had the power to enact an ordinance which defined the severity of a crime differently than did the
state law. The court said a municipality did not. After declaring
the statute to be a law of general applicability under section 3, article
XVIII, it distinguished and clarified the Sokol theory of conflict. It
held that the Sokol principle was not an exclusive test and that a
municipal ordinance was invalid which contravened ".

.

. the ex-

pressed policy of the state with respect to crimes by deliberately
changing an act which constitutes a felony under state law into a misdemeanor." 99 Therefore, it seems that municipalities have extensive
authority to define misdemeanors but not felonies.
Another area where broad power has been granted municipalities
to define crimes is in the prohibiting of the operation of pinball machines. Under state law'0 0 gambling is forbidden. In the past, the
municipal power to forbid the operation of slot machines, 1' 1 bingo
95.

154 Ohio St. 500, 96 N.E.2d 780 (1951).

Id. at 501, 96 N.E.2d at 780.
13 OHiO ST. L.J. 111 (1952).
168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 91- (1958); see Culp, Criminal Law, Survey of Ohio Law
1958, 10 WEST. RES. L. REV. 380 (1959); Criminal Law, 1958 Survey of Opinion of
the Ohio Supreme Court, 28 U. CiNc. L REV. 172 (1959).
99. City of Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 386, 389, 154 N.E.2d 917, 919 (1958).
100. OHIo RLv. CODE §§ 2915.04, 2915.15.

96.
97.
98.

101. Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 128 Ohio St. 235, 190 N.E. 569 (1934), where a slot
machine which returned tokens permittinl free play was considered to be a gambling device.
In the decision, the court said that even if the machine were intended for a lawful use its potentiality and design were such that it coula be put to unlawful use.
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games, 10 2 and lotteries, 0 3 had been sustained by the courts. The
question, in recent times, has been whether pinball devices are a form
of gambling outlawed under state law.
In the past, the Supreme Court of Ohio has considered the operation of pinball games to be a form of gambling which municipalities
could not license.0 4 Even pinball games which had the free-play device removed have been held to be gambling devices. 10 5 In Westerhaus v. City of Cincinnati, °6 the City of Cincinnati forbade the operation of pinball machines which might be used as gambling devices
(Ordinance Number 731-23). The plaintiff contended, among other
things, that the operation of the pinball games, which granted free
play upon the achievement of certain scores, was not a gambling device but a game of skill'0 7 and, therefore, was a legal amusement device. The supreme court, in rendering its decision, defined gambling
as containing three elements - the payment of a price for a chance to
win a prize. The court concluded that pinball games of the type herein mentioned were gambling contrivances and subject to being banned
by the municipality. The payment of five cents for the opportunity
to play the game satisfied the element of price. The factor of chance
was not eliminated because a certain amount of skill was necessary
to achieve the prize of additional free play. And, finally, the court
found that the amusement received, in being able to play the game,
was of some value to the player.
Benjamin v. Columbus,' decided one year later, involved essentially the power of the City of Columbus to outlaw pinball games
which required the payment of a fee or coin for their operation
(Ordinance Number 1615.54). The ordinance was more complete
than the one in the Westerhaus decision, in that it prohibited the operation of all coin-operated pinball machines regardless of whether the
machine permitted free play or not. The supreme court stated, in
its opinion, that the court presumed that: the legislative body had
validly and reasonably exercised its police, power when it enacted police ordinances. It said that the potentivility of pinball games to in102. Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 89 Ohio App. 504, 96 N.E.2d 314 (1950), dimissed for
lack of a constitutional question, 155 Ohio St. 98, 97 N.E.2d 549 (1951), where a municipality was precluded from issuing licenses to operators of bingo games who had set aside part of
their profits for charitable purposes.
103. City of Columbus v. Barr, 160 Ohio St. 209, 115 NE.2d 391 (1953).
104. Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N.2d 159 (1939).
105. Zelles v. Matowitz, 22 Ohio Op. 261, 8 OhioSupp. (NE. Reporter) 66 (Munic. Ct.
1941), dismissed for lack of a constitutional question, 139 Ohio St. 627, 41 N.E.2d 708
(1942). Cf. Wells v. City of Norwood, 100 NYE.2d 711 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951), where pinball machines which did not return discs or tokens were held to be amusement and not gambling contrivances.
106. 165 Ohio St. 327, 135 N.E.2d 318 (1956).
107. Distinguished Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N..2d 159 (1939),
which inferred that games of skill may not be considered gambling.
108. 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.X.2d 854 (1957).
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jure and harm the health, morals, safety and welfare of the community was sufficient to outlaw their operation. In order to allow a
municipality to ban entirely this activity, the high court found it necessary to distinguish the decision of Frecker v. City of Dayton.10 9 In
that case, the appellate court had decided that the word "regulations"
in the second clause of section 3, article XVIII, did not authorize
municipalities to prohibit, but merely to regulate, the activity of vending ice cream on city streets. The court, in the instant decision, rejected this reasoning. It declared that the police power of a municipality was not derived exclusively from the second grant of section 3,
article XVIII, but was understood to be included in the term "powers of local self-government." "The words appearing in section 3
of article XVIII of the constitution after the word 'self-government'
represent not a grant of legislative power but a limitation upon the
legislative power granted by the words up to and including the word
self-government." 110 This conclusion had the effect of broadening
the power granted municipalities under the term "powers of local
self-government." The court had said that police power is included
within the meaning of the term powers of "local self-government,"
and is not confined to the second clause of section 3, article XVIII.
The court, therefore, subsequently determined that municipalities had
the power to ban the operation of pinball machines.
The Election Process
If a municipality is to have genuine home rule, it must have control over the manner in which its public officials are elected. Beginning very early and continuing thereafter, the Supreme Court of Ohio
has, under the first clause of section 3, article XVIII, granted municipalities extensive authority over its election process."'
109. 88 Ohio App. 52, 85 N.E.2d 419 (1949), atfld, 153 Ohio St. 14, 90 N.E.2d 851
(1951).
110. Benjamin v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957), at syllabus 3.
111. Ohio municipalities have been granted the power: (1) to control the qualifications,
duties, and manner of election of purely municipal officers. State ex rel. Frankenstein v. Hillenbrand, 100 Ohio St. 339, 126 N.E. 309 (1919); accord, State ex rel. Schmidter v. Hillenbrand, 100 Ohio St. 534, 127 N.E. 926 (1919); but this power does not authorize a municipality to prescribe the manner or method of conducting elections for county and state officials,
State ex rel. Benjamin v. Brown, 164 Ohio St. 189, 129 N.E.2d 468 (1955); (2) to establish
the qualifications of electors in municipal elections, State ex rel. Taylor v. French, 96 Ohio St.
172, 117 N.E. 173 (1917) (The court sustained a municipality's power to qualify electors at
municipal elections despite the fact that both the state and federal constitutions restricted
suffrage to males); (3) to regulate the nomination of municipal public officials, Fitzgerald v.
City of Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913); see State ex rel. Haffner v. Green,
160 Ohio St. 189, 115 N.E.2d 154 (1953), which sustained the charter provisions closing
the filing of nomination petitions at 12:30 p. m. as against the code provision requiring the
closing of nomination petitions at 6:30 p. m.; State ex rel. Stanley v. Bernon, 127 Ohio St.
204, 187 N.E. 733 (1933) (which upheld charter provisions setting the deadline for filing
nomination petitions); (4) to determine the number of councilmen. Merryman v. Gorman,
117 N.E.2d 629 (Ohio C.P. 1953); (5) to control the mode of elections. Reutener v. City
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State ex rel. Bindas v. Andrishl"2 illustrates the "new look" taken
by the court in the area of the election of municipal officials. This
case involved the constitutionality of the appointment, made by the
city council of Youngstown, of a public school teacher to an existing
vacancy on that council. Under state law, Ohio Revised Code section
731.02, no one selected or appointed to the office of councilman could
hold any other public office. In addition, the state law clearly stated
that it should be followed in procedural matters, if the subject was
not embraced in the charter. The city charter did not cover specifically the matter of appointments to vacancies on the council. The
court decided the case by implying municipal authority to fill such
vacancies from general statements in the charter. It said that the
general qualifications established under the charter, that a councilman be twenty-five years of age and an elector in the ward from which
he is elected, were sufficient to grant council the power to fill its own
vacancies.

The court decided that "....

by specifying that its council-

men shall have certain specific qualifications the people of Youngsthat
town in their charter have inferentially expressed an intention
' 113
them.
of
required
qualifications
only
the
be
these are to
Recently, State ex rel. Devine v. Hoermle1 4 extended further the
power a municipal council has to fill its own vacancies. The circumstances concerned the power of the council of the City of Columbus
to fill the vacancy left by the death of Councilman Llewelyn. Section
5 of the charter, in a general statement, authorized council to fill its
own vacancies. After council was unable to appoint a successor withof Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 117, 141 NE. 27 (1923) (sustained municipal use of proportional representation); accord, State ex rel. Sherrill v. Brown, 155 Ohio St. 607, 99 N.E.2d 779
(1951), 21 U. CiNC. L. REv. 77 (1952); (6) to employ voting machines at municipal
elections. State ex rel. Automatic Registering Mach. v. Green, 121 Ohio St. 301, 168 N.E.
131 (1929); (7) to hold special elections. Jones v. City of Cleveland, 124 Ohio St. 544,
179 N.E. 741 (1931); (8) to settle contested municipal elections. Flotron v. Barringer, 94
Ohio St. 185, 113 N.E. 830 (1916); (9) to redistrict municipal election districts. Morrow
v. City of Cleveland, 73 Ohio App. 460, 56 N.E.2d 333 (1943); see Hammond v. Young,
117 N.E.2d 227 (Ohio C.P. 1953), where a municipal council was held to have exclusive
power to establish and change the number and boundaries of wards even if all the members
of its legislative body were elected at large; (10) to incorporate initiative and referendum
provisions in municipal charters. Dillon v. City of Cleveland, 117 Ohio St. 258, 158 N.E.
606 (1927); accord, State ex rel. Snyder v. Board of Elections of Lucas County, 146 Ohio St.
556, 67 N.E.2d 322 (1946); see Kubyak v. Kovach, 164 Ohio St. 2472 129 N.E.2d 809
(1955), where it was held that municipalities that do not adopt initiative and referendum
provisions in their charters must abide by state law regulating their use; see generally Fordham
& Prendergast, The Initiative and Referendum at the MunicipalLevel in Ohio, 20 U. CINc. L.
REV. 313 (1951); see also State ex rel. City of Toledo v. Board of Elections, 81 Ohio App.
294, 79 N.E.2d 183 (1948) (where a charter provision determining the time when a referendum election should be held was decided to preclude the board of elections from setting a
date for the election); and (11) to adopt recall of municipal officials. State ex rel. Hackley
v. Edmonds, 150 Ohio St. 203, 80 N.E.2d 769 (1948).
112. 165 Ohio St. 441, 136 N.E.2d 43 (1956); see 8 WEST. REs. L. REv. 287 (1957);
Sonenfield, Municipal Corporations,Survey of Ohio Law - 1956, 8 WEST. REs. L. REv. 341,
347 (1957); 26 U. CINc. L. REv. 415 (1957).
113. 165 Ohio St. at 445, 135 N.E.2d at 45.
114. 168 Ohio St. 461, 156 N.E.2d 131 (1959).
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in 30 days, the mayor made an appointment under the authority of
Ohio Revised Code section 731.43. This law permitted the mayor
to appoint vacancies to council when that body was unable to do so
within a 30 day period. Judge Taft, relying upon the principle of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius used in the Bindas case, held
that the charter granted the power to fill vacancies in council to
the council itself and no one else. In rendering his opinion, he rejected the reasoning that a reasonable time had passed which would
permit the mayor to make the appointment and said that the power
of council was exclusive under the general grant of power listed in the
charter.
The Spending Power
The power a municipality has to spend money as it sees fit is
limited by the tax pre-emption doctrine,"' the ten mill property limitation, 116 state law limiting municipal indebtedness," 7 and by the fact
that all money must be spent for a public purpose."' Within these
general limits, for what purposes can a municipality expend money?
In State ex rel. Thomas v. Semple," 9 the question to be decided
was whether the City of Cleveland could pay a membership fee of
$100 in a private organization, the Conference of Ohio Municipalities. The supreme court decided it could not. It reasoned, firstly, that article XVIII did not grant municipalities power to spend
money indiscriminately, secondly, that such an appropriation was not
permitted by the charter, and thirdly, that no municipality could expend funds to support a private organization.
In 195 1, the supreme court reversed the Semple case in State ex
rel. McClure v. Hagerman. 20 This time the court accepted a much
broader view of the power of municipalities to spend money when it
approved of the City of Dayton's making an expenditure of $486.22
for membership in the Municipal Finance Officers Association of
Ohio. Despite the fact that authority for such an appropriation was
not explicitly provided for in the charter, it said that appropriations
by the municipal council would be presumed to be valid. The court
held that determination of what was public purpose is a legislative
responsibility regarding which the "courts will not assume to substi115. See e.g., Ohio Finance Co. v. City of Toledo, 163 Ohio St. 81, 125 N.E.2d 731 (1955);
Haefner v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 64 (1946); Zielonka v. Carrel,
99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919).

116.

OHIO CONST. art. XII, § 2; art. XVIII, 5 13; art. XIII, § 6; OHIo REv. CODE § 5707.02.

117. OHIo REV. CODE § 133.01.
118. See State ex rel. McClure v. Hagerman, 155 Ohio St. 320, 98 N.E.2d 835 (1951),
citing as authority 38 AM. JUR. Municipal Corps. § 395 (1941), and 15 McQuILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs 35 (3d ed. 1950).
119.
112 Ohio St. 559, 148 N.E. 342 (1925).
120. 155 Ohio St. 320, 98 N.E.2d 835 (1951), 12 Omo ST. L.J. 485 (1951).
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tute their judgment for that of the authorities unless the latter's exercise of judgment or discretion is shown to have been unquestionably
abused."'' 1
Today, the heavy traffic congestion found in downtown areas has
presented municipalities with a difficult safety problem. A proposed
partial solution to the problem has involved cities in the construction
of public off-street parking facilities. For a time it was questionable
whether municipalities in Ohio had the authority to own and operate
such an enterprise. In 1951, however, the supreme court sustained
the right of Ohio municipalities to operate off-street parking facilities
in State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes.12' Although an earlier decision,
City of Cleveland v. Ruple, 123 had denied municipalities this power,
the court in the Rhodes case distinguished that prior ruling. It said
that the Cleveland case did not have a claim of necessity or public
purpose as the instant case. The sole object, in that decision, was to
secure revenue by operating a garage. That being the case, the city
was held to be improperly engaged in a private and competitive business. The court said this was not true in the present case.12 4 It
pointed out that the main question to be decided was whether the
project would serve a public municipal purpose. 25 It concluded that
the alleviation of traffic congestion and the resultant promotion of
the public health and safety fulfilled the requirements of public purpose. It added that this municipal activity was ". . . embraced in the
field of local self-government,' 2 and not dependent on state law,
Ohio General Code sections 3939-2 and 3939-3.7
Eminent Domain
An important power possessed by home-rule municipalities in
Ohio is the authority to condemn land for public purposes. In the
Rich decision, this power, known as eminent domain, was recog121. State ex rel. McClure v. Hagerman, 155 Ohio St. 320, 326,98 N.E.2d 835, 838 (1951).
122. 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d 225 (1951), 14 Omo ST. L.J. 110 (1953).
123. 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N.E. 507 (1936).
124. Inrendering its
decision, the court refused to consider the power of Ohio municipalities
as being authorized under itspower to own and operate
to own off-street parking facilities
municipal public utilities.
See, generally,OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 4. Inaddition, inarrivcompete with
ing at its
conclusion, itfailed to recognize that public off-street parking facilities
private parking operations.
125. See also State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953). See,
generally, 22 U. CINC. L. REv. 514 (1953), 10 OHio ST.LJ.414 (1949).
126. 156 Ohio St. 81, 90, 100 NB.2d 225, 230 (1951). See also City of Columbus v. Frankin County, 167 Ohio St. 256, 147 N.E.2d 625 (1958), where it was decided that off-street
parking facilities were not to be tax exempt under state law; State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes,
158 Ohio St. 129, 107 NXE.2d 206 (1952), where the court merged the receipts of on- and
off-street parking operations to help pay the principal and interest on the mortgage revenue
bonds of off-street operations.
127. Omo REv. CODE 5§ 717.05-.06.
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nized as properly belonging to incorporated cities and villages.1 28
Prior to this case, the use of eminent domain by municipalities was
restricted. Authority to use this power was limited by specific constitutional and statutory provisions.2 " With the Rich decision, complete authority to use the power of eminent domain was recognized
in Ohio municipalities. The court said:
By Section 3 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, the people of Ohio
conferred upon municipalities ... the power of eminent domain ....
There is no provision of the Ohio Constitution which authorizes the
interference by general laws with the exercise by a municipality of its
power of eminent domain .... 330
In the course of its decision, the supreme court added that the taking
of the land does not have to be exclusively for the public welfare or
for a public purpose. It is sufficient that the primary purpose be for
the public welfare, and ". . . the power may be exercised even where
there may be an 31
incidental non-public use of the property or benefit
from its taking.'
Disposal of Municipal Property
In this "new look" period, municipalities have also been given
complete power to dispose of their property unfettered by state law.
Hugger v. City of Ironton,132 concerned the purchase by the United
States Department of Agriculture of a parcel of land from the City of
Ironton. The land was sold to the Department of Agriculture for
five dollars. Plaintiff Hugger, who bid $1,500 for the same land,
contended that the sale was invalid because it conflicted with the state
law, Ohio General Code section 3699,13" requiring sale to the highest
bidder. The court decided that a "sale of real estate by a municipality is a proper exercise of the power of local self-government . .. ,,4 and this power governed both the procedure to be fol128. 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d 225 (1951), accord, Simons v. Cleveland Heights, 81
Ohio L. Abs. 129 (C.P. 1959); State ex rel. Sun Oil Co. v. City of Euclid, 164 Ohio St. 265,
130 N.E.2d 336 (1955), where it was held that the state law, OHIO REV. CODE § 723.02, was
to be followed when the procedure implementing the use of eminent domain was not outlined
in the municipal charter.
129. OHIo CONST. art. I, § 19; OHIO REV. CODE §§ 719.01-.21.
130. 159 Ohio St. 13, 32, 110 N.E.2d 778, 789 (1953).
131. Id. at 27, 110 N.E.2d at 788. The court seems in the instant case, to permit the taking
of extra land not needed for the redevelopment project contrary to the ruling in City of East
Cleveland v. Nau, 124 Ohio St. 433, 179 N.E. 187 (1931). But cf. State ex rel. Sun Oil Co.
v. City of Euclid, 164 Ohio St. 265, 272, 130 N.E.2d 336, 340 (1955), where the court cited
the Vestei case and denied municipalities the power to condemn land for some contemplated
future use.

132. 83 Ohio App. 21, 82 N.E.2d 118 (1947), appeal dismissed for lack of a constitutional
question, 148 Ohio St. 670, 76 N.E.2d 397 (1947).
133. OHIO REV. CODE § 721.03.
134. 83 Ohio App. at syllabus 1.
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lowed in the sale of the land and the substantive power to contract
for the sale itself. It reasoned that:
In this day and age, when all cities and municipalities are more or less
competing in obtaining for their inhabitants various industries, institutions and civic improvements, many times it becomes necessary to convey
property not needed for municipal purposes in exchange for these benefits. If... cities are to be bound by the old statutory provisions of
advertising and accepting the highest bid there will always be those
willing and ready to pay more in cash than the city will be able to
receive if the other benefits are to be ignored. The free and untrampled
growth of a municipality, both civic and industrially, demands that a city
have wide freedom of choice in matters of this kind. This the makers
of the Constitution of 1912 recognized 3when
they granted to munici5
palities powers of local self-government.1
Is the power of home-rule municipalities to convey land so complete that it can sell property which was initially dedicated for specific
uses? The supreme court, in Babin v. City of Ashland,'36 decided
that the City of Ashland had the power to convey 22 feet of land
designated public ground. It said that:
[T]he powers of local self-government vested in Ashland by Section 3
of Artide XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, include the legislative power
to dispose of public rights of that portion of the public represented by the
inhabitants of Ashland in land located in Ashland .... There are not
constitutional limits which would prevent or limit such an exercise of
that power. Neither does the constitution give the General Assembly
37
any authority to prevent or limit such an exercise of that power.
In State ex rel. Leach v. Redick, 138 the Supreme Court of Ohio,
following the Babin and Hugger decisions, held that a municipality
had the same home-rule authority to lease its land as it had to convey municipal property. State laws, Ohio Revised Code sections
721.01 and 721.03, which required submission of proposed leasing of
municipal land to competitive bidding and advertisement, were held
inapplicable in the face of a municipal ordinance (Ordinance 546-58)
which was passed by council in conformity with the charter of the
City of Columbus.
Miscellaneous Powers
During the 1950's, the supreme court has also seen fit to grant
municipalities the power to control and regulate a number of additional local activities. Some of these functions included the authority
to control the salaries of municipal employees,' 39 to install parking
135.
136.

83 Ohio App. 21, 30, 82 N.E.2d 118, 122 (1947).
160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953). See note, 6 WnsT. REs. L. REv. 273

(1955).
137. Id. at 350, 116 N.E.2d at 592.
138. 168 Ohio St. 543, 157 N.2d 106 (1959).
139. Craig v. Youngstown, 162 Ohio St. 215, 123 N.E.2d 19 (1954).
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meters along municipal streets, 140 to fluoridate municipal water,' 4 1 to
regulate the occupancy of trailer camps, 142 and to require the muz4 3 The court also reaffirmed
zling of dogs.1
the power of municipalities to establish, repair, and improve municipal streets, 4 4 and the
complete power to own and operate public utilities. 45
CONCLUSION

The above data indicate that the Supreme Court of Ohio is presently in the process of adopting a more favorable attitude toward
municipal home rule. This change in thinking is highly important for
the growth and development of cities in Ohio. Cities are distinct
cultural and economic entities which have many unique problems.
These needs should be satisfied. One step in this direction is to allow those closest to the situation, the people of the city, an opportunity to fulfill their wants. Broad powers of municipal home rule
facilitate such action. It is hoped that the present liberal trend of
granting the people living in municipalities a great amount of autonomy will continue to be maintained by the Ohio Supreme Court.
140. City of Kenton v. Dyer, 157 Ohio St. 93, 104 N.E.2d 182 (1952).
141. Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 121 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954), afj'd, 163 Ohio
St. 559, 127 N.E.2d 609 (1955), 7 WEST.REs. L. REv. 303 (1956).
142. Stary v. City of Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954), dismissed for lack
of a federal question, 348 U.S. 923 (1955).
143. Kovar v. City of Cleveland, 102 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951), dismissed for lack
of a constitutional question, 155 Ohio St. 469, 99 N.E.2d 182 (1951).
144. Massa v. Cincinnati, 110 N.E.2d 726 (Ohio C.P. 1953), dismissed for lack of a constitutional question, 160 Ohio St. 254, 115 N.E.2d 689 (1953).
145. State ex rel. McCann v. City of Defiance, 167 Ohio St. 313, 148 N.E.2d 221 (1958);
Cf. Swank v. Village of Shiloh, 166 Ohio St. 415, 143 N.E.2d 586 (1957), 27 U. CINc. L.

REV. 157 (1958).

